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Abstract
This paper develops a framework for repeated matching markets. The model departs from
the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived hospitals match with
a new generation of short-lived residents in every period. I show that there are two kinds
of hospitals in this repeated environment: some hospitals can be motivated dynamically to
voluntarily reduce their hiring capacity, potentially making more residents available to rural
hospitals; the others, however, are untouchable even with repeated interaction and must obtain
the same match as they do in a static matching. In large matching markets with correlated
preferences, at most a vanishingly small fraction of the hospitals are untouchable. The vast
majority of hospitals can be motivated using dynamic incentives.
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1 Introduction
A 2017 study by the US Government Accountability Office1 projects a deficit of over 20,000
primary care physicians in rural hospitals by 2025, and points to the disproportionate concentration
of medical residents in urban hospitals as a key contributing factor to this problem. Historically,
this workforce shortage in rural hospitals has lead to lower medical utilization and worse health
conditions of the rural population.2 Despite significant policy interests in increasing the number of
medical residents at rural hospitals, it has proved difficult to provide the extra funding needed for
rural hospitals to be competitive against their urban counterparts.
One promising solution is to re-design the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), so
that it matches more residents to rural hospitals (see, for example, Chapter 5.4.4 of Roth and
Sotomayor 1992). However, according to the celebrated Rural Hospital Theorem (Roth 1986),
doing so will always end up creating instabilities, and jeopardizing the operation of the hospital-
resident matching market. The Rural Hospital Theorem states:
If preferences over individuals are strict, any hospital that does not fill its quota at
some (static) stable matching is assigned precisely the same set of students at every
(static) stable matching.
If a rural hospital fails to fill its hiring slots at one static stable matching, it is then impossible
for the NRMP to create a different static stable matching that gives more or better matches to this
hospital.
However, this interpretation of the Rural Hospital Theorem is based on an assumption that
treats the market as a one-shot interaction. In reality, hospital-resident matching is an ongoing
process that takes place every year: hospitals are long-lived players that hire from this market in
every recruitment cycle, whereas students are short-lived players that participate in this process
only once. While only static matchings can be created in one-shot environments, in repeated
matching markets, a matching clearing house can create different future matchings depending on
what has happened in the past. This way, it can effectively create history-dependent matching
processes that are not subject to the implication of the Rural Hospital Theorem.
An example of such dynamic processes already exists in the Japanese Resident Matching Pro-
gram: if a hospital hires against the recommendation from the matching clearing house, it is ex-
cluded from future participation in the market.3 Thus a different future matching is created to
1https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-411.
2See, for example, Bindman, Keane and Lurie (1990), Hadley and Nair (1991) and Rosenbach and Dayhoff (1995),
and a recent coverage by NPR: https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/05/21/725118232/the-struggle-to-hire-
and-keep-doctors-in-rural-areas-means-patients-go-without-c.
3See Kamada and Kojima (2015) for more details on the Japanese matching market.
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punish the hospital for its past deviation. In the US, the NRMP is a non-profit organization that
lacks the legal authority to externally enforce compliance from the hospitals, so any matching pro-
cess it uses must be self enforcing. The goal of this paper is to investigate what can be achieved
through history-dependent matching processes that are self enforcing. In particular, I will focus on
whether it is possible to reduce urban hospitals’ hiring quotas without violating stability, thereby
making more residents available to rural hospitals.
To this end, I consider a two-sided one-to-many matching model with long-lived hospitals and
short-lived students. In each period, a new generation of students enter the market and live for one
period. The stage game is the canonical one-to-many matching game a` la Gale and Shapley (1962)
among hospitals and students who are currently active. I define a stability notion—self-enforcing
matching process—that generalizes static stability to this repeated environment. Specifically, a
matching process is a complete contingent plan that specifies a current stage-game matching as
a function of past histories. A blocking coalition in the stage game can comprise a hospital and
a set of students who also find this deviation profitable, but unlike the theory of static matching,
hospitals take the continuation play into account, and are unwilling to deviate if doing so leads to
unattractive future outcomes. A matching process is said to be self enforcing if it is immune to not
only unilateral deviations by hospitals or students, but also sequential blocking coalitions that can
be chained together by a hospital over a possibly infinite horizon.
The results in this paper identify two kinds of hospitals in repeated matching markets: some
hospitals can be motivated to voluntarily reduce their hiring quotas through continuation play,
making more residents available for rural hospitals; but there are also other hospitals that are
untouchable by dynamic enforcement. I then move on to large repeated matching markets to
characterize the relative sizes of these two kinds of hospitals, and show that the vast majority of
hospitals can indeed be motivated dynamically.
Repeated Matching. Section 3 studies a setting where the same stage-game matching is played
repeatedly in every period, and contrasts it with the benchmark static matching environment where
the stage-game is treated as a one-shot interaction.
In Section 3.2, I identify a set of players named the top coalition sequence: a hospital and a
group of students form a top coalition in the stage game if they are mutual favorites; once identified,
a top coalition is removed from the stage game, and new top coalitions are searched for among the
remaining players. The top coalition sequence is constructed by carrying through this iterative
process until there is no new top coalition. I find that the top coalition sequence defines a partition
over the set of players.
Theorem 1 shows that hospitals and students in the top coalition sequence are untouchable even
with repeated play and history dependence. A top coalition hospital is always matched to its top
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coalition students in every static stable matching. In repeated matching markets, they remain so in
every self-enforcing matching process and at every possible history of the market; this statement
also holds regardless of the patience level of the hospitals.
Theorem 1 has a simple intuition. A hospital in a top coalition is immune from any future
repercussions for its current behavior: in every future generation, it will be the favorite hospital
of its favorite students, so there is no credible way to separate this hospital from its top coalition
students in the future. As a result, it is impossible to motivate this hospital to give up its top
coalition students in the current period through continuation value. Since this arguments holds at
every history of the market and regardless of patience, we can effectively treat players in the top
coalition as inactive players. By iteratively applying the same argument to the remaining active
players, an inductive procedure extends this logic to the entire top coalition sequence.
In contrast to Theorem 1, Theorem 2 proves a folk theorem for the hospitals outside of the top
coalition sequence. When defining the minmax payoff for hospitals outside of the top coalition
sequence, it is crucial to make sure that the top coalition sequence is left intact, and calibrate the
minmax payoffs accordingly. Theorem 2 then shows that if a (randomized) stage-game matching
leaves the top coalition sequence intact, respects students’ participation constraints, and guarantees
all other hospitals higher than their appropriately defined minmax payoffs, then it can be sustained
as the stationary outcome of a self-enforcing matching process when hospitals are patient.
As we will see in the example in Section 2, in certain matching markets the top coalition se-
quence may be empty, but under some other preference configurations the top coalition sequence
may span the entire set of players. In the matching market for medical residents, hospitals’ valu-
ations of students are positively correlated, while students also have positively correlated prefer-
ences over hospitals. It is then crucial to ask: in these markets, how big is the impact from the
untouchable hospitals?
Large Repeated Matching. To answer this question, in Section 4, I build on the repeated
matching model in Section 3, but allow students to be drawn randomly from a fixed distribution
in every period. Preferences are correlated: both hospitals and students can be divided into finite
quality classes; players’ payoffs are determined by their match partners’ quality class along with an
idiosyncratic shock. I will let market size grow to infinity and focus on large market asymptotics.
In this setting, I will call the best class of hospitals elite hospitals if the size of this quality
class is vanishingly small relative to the size of the best class of students. Theorem 3 shows that
for every fixed discount factor, as market size grows large, all elite hospitals (should they exist)
must always hire at full capacity in every self-enforcing matching process. In other words, elite
hospitals are untouchable in large matching markets.
To understand the intuition for Theorem 3, note that an elite hospital faces not only no vertical
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competition, but also vanishing horizontal competition from other elite hospitals. Such “market
power” means that despite the randomness in preference realizations, an elite hospital can secure
a high continuation value no matter what. At any fixed patience level, as market size grows large,
this payoff guarantee eventually becomes high enough so that even the worst future punishment
cannot justify giving up a hiring quota in the current period.
Theorem 3 is reminiscent of Theorem 1, and highlights the difficulty in disciplining certain
hospitals in the markets. However, elite hospitals, by definition, must make up only a vanishingly
small fraction of the market. By contrast, Theorem 4 confirms that as long as a hospital qual-
ity class makes up a non-vanishing fraction of the market, we can construct a matching process
that simultaneously reduces the hiring capacity of all hospitals in this quality class; this matching
process is also self-enforcing when market size is sufficiently large and hospitals are sufficiently
patient. Perhaps surprisingly, Theorem 4 also applies to the top quality class as long as its size is
non-vanishing: in this case, there are no elite hospitals in the market.
A direct implication of Theorem 4 is that almost all hospitals can be motivated to voluntarily
reduce their hiring capacities through history dependence, regardless of how they are vertically
differentiated. To the extent that policy interests lie in allocating more students to rural hospitals,
the untouchable hospitals would only make a negligible impact on the number of students that can
be made available to the rural hospitals.
In large matching markets, hospitals’ asymptotic payoffs from static stable matchings can be
sensitive to the correlation structure of players’ preferences: they may obtain efficient payoffs even
in the worst stable matchings for hospitals (see, for example, Pittel 1989, 1992, Lee 2016, and
Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno 2017). So instead of using static stable matchings as punishments,
to prove Theorem 4, I find that a variant of the student-proposing serial dictatorship can punish
hospitals effectively even in large matching markets, which is also robust to different preference
correlation structures. The algorithm leverages horizontal competition among hospitals in the same
quality class to achieve the desired punishments, regardless of how these hospitals are vertically
differentiated.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to several different lines of research. First, there is a large and active literature
on matching with constraints pioneered by Kamada and Kojima (2015). This literature focuses on
designing matching markets under constraints, when such constraints can be enforced exogenously.
In static matching environments, Peralta (2019) explores a setting where these constraints can be
enforced ex post, but hospitals can choose to stay out of the market ex ante if they expect doing so
will lead to better payoffs. The current paper, by contrast, explores whether and what constraints
4
can be sustained through self-enforcing punishments, which is the starting point of the literature on
community enforcement (see, for example, Kandori 1992, Ellison 1994, Wolitzky 2013, Ali and
Miller 2016). While the setting and focus are different, the current paper can be viewed as a first
step in exploring whether results from the matching-with-constraints literature can be imported to
solving market design issues in a broader class of matching markets, such as the NRMP, where
external enforcement is unavailable.
Second, this paper is also related the literature on dynamic matching. Du and Livne (2016) and
Doval (2019) consider the existence of self-enforcing arrangements in a setting where matching
is one-to-one, and players leave the market permanently once matched.4 Another strand of this
literature investigates self enforcing arrangements in matching markets where the links among
long-lived players can be revised over time. See, for example, Corbae, Temzelides and Wright
(2003), Damiano and Lam (2005), Kurino (2009), Newton and Sawa (2015), Kadam and Kotowski
(2018a), Kadam and Kotowski (2018b), Kotowski (2019), and Altınok (2019). The main difference
of the current paper is that I consider a setting where a fixed set of long-lived players match with
multiple short-lived players in every period. As a result of this difference, while most of the
existing dynamic matching literature views dynamics as a friction for stability and efficiency, in
my setting, they are used as carrot and stick to enforce more stable outcomes.
Third, the current paper is also part of a nascent literature combining repeated games and
cooperative games. Bernheim and Slavov (2009) study a repeated version of Condorcet Winner.
Ali and Liu (2020) consider coalitional deviations in general repeated games where the stage game
can either be a strategic-form game or a cooperative game. The solution concept in my paper
builds on the full history dependence and subgame-perfection requirement in these papers. The
main difference is in the form of effective coalitions: in both these papers, the effective coalitions
consist of subsets of long-lived players; in the current paper, however, the effective coalitions are
those that consist of a single long-lived player and multiple generations of short-lived players. Ali
and Liu (2020) also focus on the effects of public versus secret payments, whereas the current
paper focuses on matching markets without transfers.
2 Example
In this section, I illustrate the effect of history dependence through a stylized example based on the
matching market between hospitals and medical residents.
Suppose there are three hospitals: two of these hospitals, f1 and f2, are urban hospitals, while
4See U¨nver (2010), Anderson, Ashlagi, Gamarnik and Kanoria (2015), Baccara, Lee and Yariv (2019), Leshno
(2019), and Akbarpour, Li and Gharan (2020) for the welfare implications of various dynamic matching algorithms in
such markets.
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fr is rural. Hospitals are long-lived players, each with two hiring slots to fill every year. On the
other side of the market, five medical students w1, . . . , w5 enter the market looking for residency
jobs each year. Students are short-lived players.
The left panel of Table 1 is hospitals’ stage-game utilities. For this example, we shall assume
that hospitals have additively separable utilities from matched students, and derive 0 from unfilled
positions. Observe that w5 is every hospital’s least preferred student. Students’ preference over
hospitals are in the right panel of Table 1. Each student prefers working for any hospital over
unemployment. Observe that the rural hospital fr is the worst hospital for every student.
uf (w) 5 4 3 2 1
f1 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
f2 w3 w2 w4 w1 w5
fr w2 w4 w3 w1 w5

w1 f2 f1 fr
w2 f2 f1 fr
w3 f1 f2 fr
w4 f1 f2 fr
w5 f1 f2 fr
TABLE 1. Example: Preferences
Static Stable Matchings. If the market in each period is treated as an isolated one-shot interac-
tion, then there are two static stable matchings, shown in Figure 1. Both of them match the rural
hospital fr with the worst student w5 while leaving its other position unfilled.
f1
f2
fr
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
mF
f1
f2
fr
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
mW
FIGURE 1. Static Stable Matchings
Suppose for the welfare of the patients living in rural areas, we want to match fr with a better
student w2 and create the matching m0, as shown in Figure 2. But m0 is unstable: f1 and w2 will
form a blocking pair.
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f1
f2
fr
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
FIGURE 2. m0: An Unstable Matching
A Self-Enforcing Matching Process. Now suppose the matching clearing house can vary the
matching it creates in the future based on how hospitals have matched in the past. Consider the
matching process µ0 depicted in Figure 3: hospitals and students start from the state on the right,
matching according tom0 in every period. If any hospital deviates, players will move to the state on
the left, which is an absorbing state. In this state, players match according to the student optimal
matching mW in every period. Note that this is the familiar idea of Nash Reversion, but in this
case, the stage game is a cooperative game. Hospitals’ stage-game payoffs from mW and m0 are
included in Figure 3.
If the market evolves according to µ0, then the stage-game matching m0 is played in every
period. I will show that µ0 is self-enforcing when patience is high. A one-shot deviation principle,
established later in Lemma 1, implies that a matching process is self-enforcing if and only if two
requirements are satisfied at every history of the market:
1. no student wishes to unilaterally leave her matched hospital, and
2. no hospital finds it profitable to conduct a one-shot deviation with a group of students who
also find this deviation profitable.
m0
<latexit sha1_base64="+GThQMsSbeEY5RfrlWYura7w1XM=">AAAB7HicbV BNSwMxEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqexWQY8FLx4ruG2hXUo2zbahSXZJskJZ+hu8eFDEqz/Im//GtN2Dtj4YeLw3w8y8KBXcWM/7RqWNza3tnfJuZW//4PCoenzSNkmmK QtoIhLdjYhhgisWWG4F66aaERkJ1okmd3O/88S04Yl6tNOUhZKMFI85JdZJgRzk3mxQrXl1bwG8TvyC1KBAa1D96g8TmkmmLBXEmJ7vpTbMibacCjar9DPDUkI nZMR6jioimQnzxbEzfOGUIY4T7UpZvFB/T+REGjOVkeuUxI7NqjcX//N6mY1vw5yrNLNM0eWiOBPYJnj+OR5yzagVU0cI1dzdiumYaEKty6fiQvBXX14n7Ubdv6 o3Hq5rzWYRRxnO4BwuwYcbaMI9tCAAChye4RXekEIv6B19LFtLqJg5hT9Anz++nY6i</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="+GThQMsSbeEY5RfrlWYura7w1XM=">AAAB7HicbV BNSwMxEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqexWQY8FLx4ruG2hXUo2zbahSXZJskJZ+hu8eFDEqz/Im//GtN2Dtj4YeLw3w8y8KBXcWM/7RqWNza3tnfJuZW//4PCoenzSNkmmK QtoIhLdjYhhgisWWG4F66aaERkJ1okmd3O/88S04Yl6tNOUhZKMFI85JdZJgRzk3mxQrXl1bwG8TvyC1KBAa1D96g8TmkmmLBXEmJ7vpTbMibacCjar9DPDUkI nZMR6jioimQnzxbEzfOGUIY4T7UpZvFB/T+REGjOVkeuUxI7NqjcX//N6mY1vw5yrNLNM0eWiOBPYJnj+OR5yzagVU0cI1dzdiumYaEKty6fiQvBXX14n7Ubdv6 o3Hq5rzWYRRxnO4BwuwYcbaMI9tCAAChye4RXekEIv6B19LFtLqJg5hT9Anz++nY6i</latexit>
(6, 8, 5)
No Hospital 
Deviates
mW
<latexit sha1_base64="DFvwpfrH/ 0Xdl601mkP5gqod5Yg=">AAAB+HicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1ofjbp0EyyCq5JUQZcFN y4r2Ae0IUymk3bozCTMTIQa8iVuXCji1k9x5984abPQ1gMDh3Pu5Z45YcKo0q 77bVU2Nre2d6q7tb39g8O6fXTcU3EqMenimMVyECJFGBWkq6lmZJBIgnjISD+ c3RZ+/5FIRWPxoOcJ8TmaCBpRjLSRArvOg2zEkZ5ixLJ+ngd2w226CzjrxCtJA 0p0AvtrNI5xyonQmCGlhp6baD9DUlPMSF4bpYokCM/QhAwNFYgT5WeL4Llzbp SxE8XSPKGdhfp7I0NcqTkPzWSRUa16hfifN0x1dONnVCSpJgIvD0Upc3TsFC0 4YyoJ1mxuCMKSmqwOniKJsDZd1UwJ3uqX10mv1fQum637q0a7XdZRhVM4gwvw4 BracAcd6AKGFJ7hFd6sJ+vFerc+lqMVq9w5gT+wPn8AYG+TjA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DFvwpfrH/ 0Xdl601mkP5gqod5Yg=">AAAB+HicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1ofjbp0EyyCq5JUQZcFN y4r2Ae0IUymk3bozCTMTIQa8iVuXCji1k9x5984abPQ1gMDh3Pu5Z45YcKo0q 77bVU2Nre2d6q7tb39g8O6fXTcU3EqMenimMVyECJFGBWkq6lmZJBIgnjISD+ c3RZ+/5FIRWPxoOcJ8TmaCBpRjLSRArvOg2zEkZ5ixLJ+ngd2w226CzjrxCtJA 0p0AvtrNI5xyonQmCGlhp6baD9DUlPMSF4bpYokCM/QhAwNFYgT5WeL4Llzbp SxE8XSPKGdhfp7I0NcqTkPzWSRUa16hfifN0x1dONnVCSpJgIvD0Upc3TsFC0 4YyoJ1mxuCMKSmqwOniKJsDZd1UwJ3uqX10mv1fQum637q0a7XdZRhVM4gwvw4 BracAcd6AKGFJ7hFd6sJ+vFerc+lqMVq9w5gT+wPn8AYG+TjA==</latexit>
(5, 6, 1)
Any Deviation 
Involving a Hospital
FIGURE 3. A Self-Enforcing Matching Process Implementing m0
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The state on the left is self-enforcing since it is the infinite repetition of a static stable matching:
by construction, there are no profitable deviations. In the state on the right, since every student
prefers employment, no students would wish to unilaterally leave their hospital. By following µ0,
f1 receives 6 every period from matching with {w1, w5}. If f1 were to deviate with any student,
it receives no more than 9 in the current period, and 5 from all future periods. As long as f1’s
discount factor δ satisfies (1 − δ)9 + δ5 < 6, or δ > 3/4, f1 would not find such one-shot
deviations profitable. A similar argument rules out any profitable one-shot deviations involving f2.
In light of Lemma 1, µ0 is a self-enforcing matching process for δ > 3/4.
Limits of Self Enforcement. The analysis so far has shown it’s possible to use history depen-
dence to expand the set of stable outcome. The next example will illustrate that certain preference
configurations can severely limit this ability.
uf (w) 5 4 3 2 1
f1 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
f2 w3 w2 w4 w1 w5
fr w2 w4 w3 w1 w5

w1 f1 f2 fr
w2 f1 f2 fr
w3 f1 f2 fr
w4 f1 f2 fr
w5 f1 f2 fr
TABLE 2. Students Share Identical Preference
Consider the market in Table 2: the only difference from Table 1 is that now all students share a
common preference ranking f1  f2  fr over hospitals. There is a unique static stable matching
m∗ in this market, as depicted in Figure 4. In this market, however, no self-enforcing matching
process can sustain any matching other than m∗ regardless of how patient the hospitals are.
f1
f2
fr
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
FIGURE 4. m∗: The Unique Stable Matching
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To see why, first observe that as everyone’s favorite hospital, f1 finds its favorite students
{w1, w2} available in every future generation: whenever f1 is not matched to {w1, w2}, it can
always poach them. Since {w1, w2} also happen to give f1 the highest possible stage-game payoff,
it is therefore impossible to either punish or reward f1 through continuation value. Without changes
in continuation value, f1 acts like a short-lived player, and will always match with {w1, w2} in
every self-enforcing matching process at every history of the market.
Now since {f1, w1, w2} are always matched together, they can be disregarded by other players.
This makes f2 every student’s favorite hospital among the remaining hospitals, and f2 finds its
favorite students among the remaining students, {w3, w4}, always available in every future gener-
ation. The only way to credibly remove w3 or w4 from f2 is to match them with f1—otherwise
f2 can simply poach them back. But this isn’t possible since f1 is always occupied by {w1, w2}
at every history. Without changes in continuation value, f2 also behaves myopically, and matches
with {w3, w4} at every history. A similar “peeling” argument along students’ shared preference
list ensures that fr is always matched with w5 in every self-enforcing matching process.
None of the arguments above involved the hospitals’ patience, so for all 0 < δ < 1, the only
self-enforcing matching process is the one where m∗ is played after every history. Even with
history dependence, the market functions like a one-shot interaction.
Takeaway. From the examples above, we see that depending on players’ preference configuration,
history dependence may or may not be able to expand the set of stable outcomes. It’s worth
noting that the uniqueness of static stable outcome is not responsible for the collapse of dynamic
enforcement: in fact, if the hospitals share a common ranking over students, the market will have
a unique static stable matching. But in this case it is possible to expand the set of stable outcomes
through history dependence (see Observation 2).
The results in Section 3 show that in general, there is a partition over the set of players: in one
element of the partition, players may obtain matches that are unavailable in static stable matchings
if hospitals are patient; in the other element of the partition, however, players always match in the
same way as they do in a static stable matching regardless of hospitals’ patience. The results in
Section 4 characterize asymptotically the size and composition of these two kinds of players when
market size grows to infinity.
3 Repeated Matching Market
In this section, I first review the benchmark static matching environment, then extend the model to
repeated matching markets. I also introduce the notion of top coalition sequence, and show that it
determines whether or not a hospital can be motivated through continuation play.
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3.1 Model
Players. At the beginning of every period t = 0, 1, 2 . . ., a new generation of studentsW enter
the market to match with a fixed set of hospitals F . Hospitals are long-lived players that persist
through time, each f having qf > 0 hiring slots to fill in every period. Students are short-lived and
remain in the market for only one period.
Each hospital f has utility function u˜f : 2W → R over subsets of students. Hospitals’ utility
functions are strict
(
u˜f (W ) = u˜f (W
′) only if W = W ′
)
and responsive: for all f ∈ F , W ⊆ W ,
w ∈ W and w′ /∈ W ,
u˜f
(
W ∪ {w′}\{w}) > u˜f(W) if u˜f({w′}) > u˜f({w}).
Hospitals share a common discount factor δ, and evaluate a sequence of flow utilities through
exponential discounting. Each studentw has a strict preference relationw over the set of hospitals
and being unmatched (being unmatched is denoted w). I write f w f ′ if either f w f ′ or f = f ′.
Stage Game. The stage game in every period is a static one-to-many matching game played
between the hospitals and the students who are active in that period. Formally, a stage-game
matching m is a mapping defined on the set F ∪ W such that: (i) for every w ∈ W , m(w) ∈
F ∪ {w}; (ii) for every f ∈ F , m(f) ⊆ W and |m(f)| ≤ qf ; and (iii) w ∈ m(f) if and only if
m(w) = f . LetM denote the set of all stage-game matchings. For each f ∈ F , let uf : M → R be
hospital f ’s utility function over stage-game matchings induced from its preference over students:
uf (m) ≡ u˜f (m(f)) for all m ∈M .
A stage-game matchingm is subject to deviations from three kinds of coalitions: (i) a singleton
coalition {f} where hospital f unilaterally fires a subset of its employees; (ii) a singleton coalition
{w} where student w leaves her employer and remain unmatched; and (iii) a coalition {f} ∪W
with |W | ≤ qf , where hospital f and W match together, abandoning any other pre-existing match
partners. A coalitional deviation is profitable if all members of the coalition prefer the deviation to
the original matchingm. A stage-game matching is stable if none of these three kinds of coalitional
deviations can be profitable; it is individually rational if no singleton coalitions are profitable.5
In static matching models, there is no need to specify the resulting matching outcome after a
deviation. This is because in static matching environments, the profitability of a deviation does not
depend on how others respond. However, in repeated matching markets where the past influences
the future, we have to specify what outcome is realized after a deviation.
5This notion of stability is stronger than pairwise stability, but weaker than the core. See Roth (1991) for a
discussion of why stability may be a more appropriate solution concept than the core when modeling hospital resident
matching.
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To this end, let [m, (f,W )] ∈ M denote the resulting stage-game matching after coalition
{f} ∪W deviates from stage-game matching m. I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The stage-game matching m′ = [m, (f,W )] satisfies m′(f) = W , and m′(f ′) =
m(f ′)\W for all f ′ 6= f .
Assumption 1 states that members of the deviating coalition are matched together in the re-
sulting stage-game matching; in addition, players abandoned by the deviators remain unmatched,
while those untouched by the deviation remain matched as before. One can make alternative as-
sumptions that specify how other players may further deviate within the period after the initial
deviation. As long as it is possible to identify the hospital that initiated the first deviation, identical
results follow.6
Repeated Matching Game. The timing in each period is as follows: at the beginning of the
period, a realization ω ∈ Ω is drawn from a public randomization device (by, for example, a
centralized matching clearing house); based on ω and the history of past interactions, a recom-
mended stage-game matching is created for the active players in the market; hospitals and students
then decide whether to deviate from this recommendation, which leads to the realized stage-game
matching.7
A t-period ex ante histories h = (ωτ ,mτ )t−1τ=0 specifies a sequence of past realizations from the
public randomization device and matching outcomes, before the randomization at the beginning of
period t is drawn. I use Ht to denote the set of all t-period ex ante histories, with H0 = {∅} the
singleton set comprising the initial null history. LetH ≡ ∪∞t=0Ht be the set of all ex ante histories.
Ht ≡ Ht×Ω is the set of t-period ex post histories, andH ≡ H×Ω the set of all ex post histories.
A matching process proposes a stage-game matching following each ex post history: a match-
ing process µ is a mapping µ : H →M . In the context of the NRMP, one can interpret a matching
process as proposals from a history-dependent matching protocol. I use µ(f |h) and µ(w|h) to de-
note the match partners for hospital f and studentw in the stage-game matching µ(h), respectively.
Let H∞ = (Ω×M)∞ be the set of outcomes of the repeated matching game. For an outcome
h ∈ H∞, let mτ (h) denote the stage game matching in the τ -th period of h. Following every
6Assumption 1 is only needed for establishing Lemma 10 in Appendix B.1: it is always possible to identify the
hospital responsible for a deviation. As the main application of the current paper, the NRMP keeps extensive records
of past matching outcomes, and actively investigate possible non-compliance from participants. See, for example,
http://www.nrmp.org/reporting-investigation-violations.
7Note that the public randomization device is not intended to represent the random realization of players’ prefer-
ences. Instead, it represents internal randomization by the matching clearing house. So far, preferences are assumed
to be pre-determined; in Section 4, I augment the stage-game to account for the random preferences realizations.
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t-period (ex ante or ex post) history ĥ ∈ H ∪H, let
Uf (ĥ|µ) ≡ (1− δ)Eµ
[ ∞∑
τ=t
δτ−tuf (mτ (h))
∣∣∣ ĥ ].
denote the continuation payoff hospital f obtains from µ following ĥ, where the expectation is
taken with respect to the measure overH∞ induced by µ conditional on ĥ.
Deviation Plan. In repeated matching markets, unlike in static matching markets, players may
participate in deviations that span multiple periods. I make two observations that allow us to
tractably analyze these deviations.
Recall that there are three kinds of deviations in the stage game. Our first observation is that a
deviation in the stage-game by the singleton coalition {f}, where f fires a subset of its employees,
is equivalent to a deviation by the coalition consisting of f and the students that remain with f . It
is therefore without loss to focus in the stage game only on (i) deviations by coalitions in the form
of {w}, and (ii) deviations by coalitions in the form of {f} ∪W .
The second observation is that as a long-lived player, a hospital f can participate in a sequence
of deviations, by forming coalitions with students across multiple generations. Each of these coali-
tions must be immediately profitable for the participating short-lived students, but not necessarily
for f since hospitals care about the utility it collects from the entire sequence.
Motivated by this second observation, I define a deviation plan for hospital f as a complete
contingent plan that specifies, at each ex post history, a set of students with whom f wishes to
form a deviating coalition: a deviation plan for hospital is a mapping df : H → 2W . Together with
the original matching process, a deviation plan generates an altered distribution over the outcome
of the gameH∞. Given a matching process µ and f ’s deviation plan df , the manipulated matching
process, denoted [µ, (f, df )] : H →M , is a matching process defined by:
[µ, (f, df )](h) ≡
[
µ(h), (f, df (h))
]
for every h ∈ H.
The deviation plan df is feasible if |df (h) ≤ qf | and f w µ(w|h) for every ex post history h and
w ∈ d(h)\µ(f |h): at every history, any student specified by the deviation plan is either already
recommended by µ to work for f , or finds himself strictly better off to work for f against the recom-
mendation by µ. Lastly, df is profitable if there exists ex post history h such that Uf (h|[µ, (f, df )])
> Uf (h|µ).
For much of the analysis in this paper, I will make use of a special class of deviation plans: a
deviation plan df is a one-shot deviation from a matching process µ if there is a unique ex post
history ĥ where df (ĥ) 6= µ(f |ĥ).
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Self-Enforcing Matching Process. The two observations above motivate the solution concept.
Definition 1. A matching process µ : H →M is self-enforcing if
1. µ(w|h) w w for every w at every ex post history h; and
2. no hospital f has a deviation plan that is both feasible and profitable.
The first requirement in Definition 1 guards against deviations by singleton students in ev-
ery generation; the second requirement asks that no hospital can profit from chaining together a
sequence of deviating coalitions, each one of which immediately profitable for the deviating stu-
dents, but not necessarily for the hospital itself. Note that these requirements are imposed at every
ex post history, including those that are off path: this embeds sequential rationality in the same
way as subgame perfection does in a repeated non-cooperative game. Also note that in one-shot
matching market, Definition 1 coincides with the definition for static stable matchings.
Lemma 1 below establishes a one-shot deviation principle for self-enforcing matching pro-
cesses: to check for the stability of matching process, instead of checking all deviation plans, it
suffices to focus on those that only depart from the matching process at a single history.
Lemma 1 (One-Shot Deviation Principle). A matching process µ is self-enforcing if and only if
1. µ(w|h) w w for every w at every ex post history h; and
2. no hospital f has a one-shot deviation that is both profitable and feasible.
The proof of Lemma 1 follows similar arguments to the one-shot deviation principle for re-
peated non-cooperative games, and is relegated to Appendix B.1. An immediate implication of
Lemma 1 is that self-enforcing matching processes exist at every patience level.
Observation 1. There exists a self-enforcing matching process for every 0 ≤ δ < 1.
Recall that we assumed hospitals preferences are responsive. Standard results in the static
matching literature (see, for example, Theorem 6.5 in Roth and Sotomayor 1992) then ensure the
existence of stable static matchings; By Lemma 1, the infinite repetition of a static stable matching
is always a self-enforcing matching process.
3.2 Top Coalition Sequence
In the second example in Section 2, history dependence is powerless to top hospitals due to their
immunity to future punishments. In a general matching environment without assuming common
student preferences, the appropriate notion of top players is captured by top coalitions.
Fix an arbitrary subset of hospitals and students F ∪W ⊆ F ∪W . A hospital f̂ ∈ F and a set
of students Ŵ ⊆ W , |Ŵ | ≤ qf form a top coalition in F ∪W if
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1. u˜f̂ (Ŵ ) ≥ uf̂ (W ′) for all W ′ ⊆ W : Ŵ is f̂ ’s favorite group of students among W ; and
2. f̂ w f ′ for all w ∈ Ŵ and f ′ ∈ F ∪ {w}: f̂ is the favorite hospital for every student in Ŵ .
In other words, f̂ and Ŵ are mutual favorites. The top coalition sequence takes this idea
further by iteratively finding and eliminating top coalitions in the remaining players, until no new
top coalition can be found.
Definition 2. The top coalition sequence is the ordered set T = {(f̂1, Ŵ1), (f̂2, Ŵ2), . . .} produced
by the following procedure:8
• Initialization: Set T = ∅;
• New Phase:
1. If (F ∪W)\T contains no top coalition, stop.
2. If (F ∪W)\T has a top coalition (f̂ , Ŵ ), add (f̂ , Ŵ ) to T and restart New Phase.
Top coalition sequence is related to but distinct from the “top coalition property” studied in
a variety of cooperative game settings. While the top coalition property is an assumption which
requires certain subsets of players to have at least one a top coalition, the top coalition sequence,
by contrast, is an object that is constructed from arbitrary player preferences.9
Below are some observations on how the composition of the top coalition sequence may depend
on the preference configurations in the market.
Observation 2. Suppose all hospitals are acceptable to all students (f w w for all w ∈ W):
1. If students share a common preference ranking over hospitals, then all players are in the top
coalition sequence.
2. When hospitals share a common utility function over students, the top coalition sequence
may be empty.
The first observation above follows from iterative elimination of the top hospital along the stu-
dents’ shared preference list, just like in the second example in Section 2. The second observation
is illustrated through the following example.
Example 1. F = {f1, f2} andW = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. The two hospitals f1 and f2 are identical:
both have capacity qf1 = qf2 = 2 and share a common utility function uf1(wi) = uf2(wi) = i.
Suppose wi= f1, f2, wi if i is odd, and wi= f2, f1, wi if i is even.
8Whenever it causes no confusion, I will use T to denote both the set of (f,W ) pairs and the set of players that
show up in those pairs.
9See, for example, Eeckhout (2000), Banerjee, Konishi and So¨nmez (2001) and Wu (2015) for applications of the
top coalition property. See Peralta (2019) for an example of the application of top coalition sequence in static matching
environments.
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The procedure in Definition 2 stops at the first step: both hospitals point to {w3, w4} as their
favorite students, but since neither f1 nor f2 is the favorite for both {w3, w4}, there is no top
coalition and T = ∅.
3.3 The Limit of Self-Enforcement
The results in this section explore the extent to which history dependence can be used to alter the
matches obtained by players in the top coalition sequence versus those that are not.
Impossible to Motivate Top Coalition Sequence. As Theorem 1 shows, if a student is in the
coalition sequence, then even in a repeated matching market and when hospitals are patient, it is
impossible to send her to a rural hospital without creating instability.
Theorem 1. Suppose (f̂ , Ŵ ) is in the top coalition sequence, then f̂ is matched to Ŵ in all static
stable matchings. Moreover, for every 0 < δ < 1, f̂ is matched to Ŵ in every self enforcing
matching process at every ex post history.
Theorem 1 states that the hospitals and students in the top coalition sequence are always
matched together in both static and repeated matching markets. This holds in a stark sense in
repeated matching markets since it applies regardless of hospitals’ patience and after every ex post
history, including those that are off-path.
Here are the key steps for establishing Theorem 1: first, (f̂ , Ŵ ) being mutual favorites implies
that they must be matched together in any static stable matching. Second, in a repeated matching
market, (f̂ , Ŵ ) being mutual favorites further implies that f̂ is not punishable through continuation
value: whenever a matching process recommends f̂ to match with W 6= Ŵ , everyone in Ŵ is
willing to deviate with f̂ , so f̂ ’s continuation value cannot be lower than uf̂ (Ŵ ); at the same
time, f̂ ’s continuation value also cannot be higher than uf̂ (Ŵ ), so f̂ ’s continuation value must
be precisely uf̂ (Ŵ ), no matter what happens in the current period. Without credible changes in
continuation value, f̂ behaves just like a short-lived player, so it must always match with Ŵ at
every ex post history. Finally, an inductive argument extends this logic to the entire top coalition
sequence.
Difference from Standard Folk Theorem. The “impossibility” implication from Theorem 1
stands in contrast with what one might expect from standard folk theorems for repeated games,
where many outcomes are sustainable at high patience levels—here, the matching outcome for
players in T is unique no matter how high the patience is.
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To understand why, think of the hospitals as players who choose groups of students as their
“actions”.10 Note that whenever a stage-game matching m is recommended, a hospital f can al-
ways deviate from this recommendation by choosing from students inDf (m) ≡ m(f)∪{w ∈ W :
f w m(f)}. At the same time, a self-enforcing matching process can only credibly recommend
stage-game matchings in M◦ ≡ {m ∈ M : m w w for all w ∈ W}. One way to define the
minmax payoff for each hospital f is then
uf ≡ min
m∈M◦
max
W⊆Df (m)
uf (W ). (1)
A folk theorem would state that any payoff profile giving every hospital f strictly higher than its
respective uf can be sustained through a self-enforcing matching process as δ → 1.
However, the problem with this approach is that whenever T is nonempty and contains, say,
(f̂ , Ŵ ), then Ŵ ⊆ Df̂ (m) for all m ∈ M◦. According to Eq. (1), hospital f̂ ’s minmax payoff
satisfies
uf̂ = minm∈M◦
max
W⊆Df (m)
uf (W ) ≥ uf̂ (Ŵ ) = maxW⊆W uf̂ (W ).
In other words, f̂ ’s minmax payoff is identical to its highest feasible payoff, so the set of feasible
payoff profiles giving f̂ strictly higher than uf̂ is an empty set. A top coalition hospital essentially
has an “action” that guarantees itself the highest possible payoff from the stage game indepen-
dent of the “actions” of other hospitals, and the folk theorem is always vacuous for such payoff
structures.
Moreover, Eq. (1) also leads to incorrect minmax payoffs for hospitals that are not in T . In
light of Theorem 1, some stage-game matchings in M◦ fails to account for the constraint that
any credible recommendation must match f̂ with Ŵ . As a result, Eq. (1) incorrectly assumes that
f̂ ’s hiring capacity can be used when punishing other hospitals, which underestimates the minmax
payoffs for hospitals other than f̂ .
It is worth noting that the subtlety introduced by the top coalition sequence is different from the
failure of full dimensionality that is studied in Wen (1994) and Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi
(2007). In Wen (1994) and Fudenberg et al. (2007), there is a non-empty set of payoff profiles
that are feasible and give each player strictly higher than her minmax; however, this set lacks
dimensionality due to long-run players having aligned preferences. The presence of top coalition
sequence, by contrast, leads to an empty set of such payoff profiles. The construction of top
coalition sequence in Definition 2 is an interative process of finding degenerate payoff dimensions
while recalibrating minmax payoff for remaining hospitals, until we arrive at a reduced game
without new top coalitions.
10See the Conclusion and Appendix B.4 for more detailed discussions on this alternative representation of the stage
game, and how it relates to cooperative game form of two-sided matching games.
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Modified Folk Theorem in the Reduced Game. Motivated by the discussion above, let us
introduce a few notations that are useful for analyzing the reduced game after the top coalition
sequence has been romoved. Let R ≡ (F ∪ W)\T denote the players that are not in the top
coalition sequence, and MR denote the set of stage-game matchings that ensure the top coalition
sequence is matched together:
MR ≡
{
m ∈M : m(f̂) = Ŵ for all (f̂ , Ŵ ) ∈ T }.
Let M◦R denote the stage-game matchings in MR that are individually rational for the students. For
every hospital f ∈ F ∩R, its reduced-game minmax is
uRf ≡ min
m∈M◦R
max
W⊆Df (m)
uf (W ). (2)
Notice that for every hospital f ∈ F ∩ R, its reduced-game minmax is higher than the naive
calculation in Eq. (1), since the minimization is taken over a more restricted set of stage-game
recommendations. Finally, let Λ∗ ≡ {λ ∈ ∆(M◦R) : uf (λ) > uRf for all f ∈ F ∩ R} denote the
randomizations over M◦R that secure each hospital strictly higher than its reduced-game minmax.
In contrast to Theorem 1, Theorem 2 shows that history dependence can be used to change the
matches obtained by players outside of the top coalition sequence: every random matching in Λ∗
can be sustained on path in a stationary manner in a self-enforcing matching process.
Theorem 2. For every λ ∈ Λ∗, there is a δ such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exists a self-
enforcing matching process that randomizes according to λ in every period.
The first step of the proof is showing that hospitals’ payoffs in the reduced game always sat-
isfy the Non-Equivalent Utilities (NEU) condition: no hospital’s payoff can be a positive affine
transformation of another (Abreu, Dutta and Smith 1994). The proof then uses this condition to
construct player-specific punishments to deter deviations. Given these punishments, the final step
adapts the construction from Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) to show that the payoff profile corre-
sponding to any λ ∈ Λ∗ can be sustained in a self-enforcing matching process when hospitals are
patient.
4 Large Market Analysis
We see in Section 3 that certain hospitals are untouchable, while the others can be motivated
through history dependence. But how big is the untouchable set, relative to those that are ad-
justable? The goal of this section is to quantify asymptotically the size of these two kinds of
hospitals. In order to do this, I build on the repeated matching model introduced in Section 3,
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but augment it with randomly drawn students and focus on large market analysis. Section 4.1
introduces this setup; Section 4.2 characterizes the large market asymptotics in this environment.
4.1 The Setup
I consider a sequence of market sizes n, letting n diverge to infinity. In a market of size n, the stage
game consists of n hospitalsFn, each with hiring quota q,11 and studentsWn, where |Wn| = dβnqe
with β > 0. Let Mn denote the set of stage-game matchings among Fn andWn.
I use the finite-tier model for random preferences to capture positive preference correlations
that arise from quality differentiations in the market.12 For every n, hospitals can be partitioned into
K quality classes Fn = {F1n,F2n, . . . ,FKn }. Every student prefers a hospital from a higher quality
class to those from a lower quality class; but each student’s preference ranking over hospitals
within the same quality class Fkn is drawn uniformly from all permutations of Fkn . Let pin denote
a realization of student preferences that are compatible with this restriction. I assume that the
proportion of tier-k hospitals,
∣∣Fkn∣∣ /n, converges to xk ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Similarly, students can be partitioned into L quality classesWn = {W1n,W2n, . . . ,WLn }. When
a hospital f matches with student w ∈ W ln, the hospital receives
u˜f (w) = V (Cl, ζf,w),
where Cl is the common value shared by all students in W ln satisfying Cl > Cl′ for all l < l′,
and ζf,w is the idiosyncratic match quality between f and w. I assume that the quality component
for each tier, Cl, is constant over time, while the idiosyncratic components ζf,w are drawn inde-
pendently for every student in each cohort from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. V (., .) is a
continuous and strictly increasing function from R2+ to R+, and satisfies V (Cl, 0) > V (Cl′ , 1) for
all l < l′ (so there is no overlap between tiers). Hospitals have additive utilities for each hiring slot:
u˜f (W ) =
∑
w∈W u˜f (w), and derive zero utility from unfilled positions. Let ζn = {ζf,w}f∈Fn,w∈Wn
denote a realization of the matrix of idiosyncratic match qualities. I assume that the proportion of
tier-l students,
∣∣W ln∣∣ / |Wn|, converges to yl ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ l ≤ L.
The timing in each period is as follows: first, a new cohort of students arrive and preferences
pin and ζn are realized; the public randomization ω ∈ Ω is then realized; based on the realization of
(pin, ζn, ωn), a stage-game matching is recommended for Fn andWn; players then decide whether
to deviate from this recommendation, which determines the outcome of the stage-game. I will refer
11The assumption that each hospital has identical quota is only for convenience. The same results continue to hold
if each hospital has a different quota.
12See, for example, Pittel (1989), Knuth (1997), Ashlagi et al. (2017), and Che and Tercieux (2019) for similar use
of this class of preferences.
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to the realization of sn = (pin, ζn, ωn) ∈ Sn together as a state. The notions of ex ante and ex post
histories, introduced in Section 3, are modified accordingly with sn replacing ω.
4.2 Which Hospitals Are Untouchable?
I find that in repeated large matching markets, the vast majority of hospitals can be motivated
dynamically to voluntarily reduced their capacities. The only exceptions, should they exist, are
elite hospitals that by definition only makes up a vanishingly small fraction of the market.
Specifically, I say the top class of hospitals F1n are elite hospitals if their size is vanishing
relative to the top class of students.
Definition 3. F1n is an elite quality class if |F1n| / |W1n| → 0 as n→∞.
A hospital inF1n faces no vertical competition, since it dominates hospitals from all other lower
quality classes. If F1n is in addition an elite hospital class, then it also faces diminishing horizontal
competition from within the same quality class. Note that elite hospitals may not necessarily exist.
For example, if limn→∞F1n/n > 0, then no hospitals in the market would qualify as elite hospitals.
Theorem 3 shows that no matter how patient the hospitals are, when market size is large, it
would be difficult to reduce elite hospitals’ hiring capacities through history dependence.
Theorem 3. Suppose F1n is an elite hospital class, then for every discount factor 0 < δ < 1, there
exists N such that for all n ≥ N , every self-enforcing matching process µ satisfies |µ(f |h)| = q
for all f ∈ F1n and all ex post history h.
Note that Theorem 3 is not a folk theorem: instead of taking patience δ to 1, I consider an
arbitrary fixed δ while taking market size n to infinity. Here is the intuition for establishing The-
orem 3. As n → ∞, an elite hospital f faces no vertical competition and diminishing horizontal
competition. When market is sufficiently large, f can with very high probability fill all its hiring
slots with students who are mutual favorites with it. This guarantees f almost the highest possible
continuation value, no matter what happens in the present. Even though this is not exactly the
highest possible continuation value, since δ is fixed instead of arbitrarily close to 1, such small
variation in future value is not enough to motivate hospital f to give up a hiring slot in the current
period. As a result, f always hires at full capacity after every history.
Note that for every fixed N , there is a sufficiently high δ that allows self-enforcing matching
processes with reduced capacity for F1n. So another way of interpreting Theorem 3 is that the
ability to reduce F1n’s capacity comes down to a race between patience δ and market size N , and
no amount of patience can be sufficient for all large market sizes.
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While Theorem 3 highlights the difficulties in reducing the capacity of elite hospitals, it is
worth remembering that elite hospitals, by definition, only make up a vanishing fraction of the
total seats in the market. To the extent that the policy interests lie in allocating more residents to
rural hospitals, their impact is negligible. The next result, Theorem 4, confirms that as long as
a hospital class makes up a non-vanishing fraction of the market, it is indeed possible to reduce
their capacities. Perhaps surprisingly, this also applies to F1n. Furthermore, unlike Theorem 3, the
affirmative message of Theorem 4 is not the result of a race between δ and N : Theorem 4 holds
true especially when both δ and N are large.
Theorem 4. Suppose limn→∞
∣∣Fkn∣∣ /n > 0 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ K. We can find a sequence of
matching processes {µ∗n}∞n=1, a discount factor 0 < δ < 1, a market size N , and probability
p∗ > 0, such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1) and n > N :
1. µ∗n is a self-enforcing matching process; and
2. P (|µ∗n(f |h)| < q) ≥ p∗ for every f ∈ Fkn and every on-path ex post history h.
The second condition in Theorem 4 says that the matching process µ∗n can reduce the capacity
of all hospitals inFkn with positive probability; moreover, this positive probability is bounded away
from 0 as n→∞.
The proof of Theorem 4 builds on techniques from the repeated game literature and the large
matching market literature. In order to sustain matching processes with reduced capacities forFkn , I
utilize a folk-theorem construction like that from Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). On path, hospitals
in Fkn are asked to reduce their capacity and as a reward for their compliance, they are sometimes
allowed to choose their favorite students through a hospital-proposing random serial dictatorship.
I use existing results on large matching markets from Che and Tercieux (2018) to characterize the
expected payoffs from such rewards. In case of a non-compliance from any hospital f ∈ F1n, f
undergoes a punishment phase for a few periods to offset the gains from its deviation, before the
market resets with f being asked to make an even greater reduction in its capacity.
However, unlike standard repeated games, large matching markets also present a unique chal-
lenge: in large matching markets with correlated preferences, hospitals may obtain efficient payoffs
from all stable matching algorithms (Lee 2016; Ashlagi et al. 2017). The crucial part of the proof
for Theorem 4 boils down to finding a “punishment algorithm” that: 1. holds down a hospital’s
expected payoff asymptotically as market size gets large, and 2. makes sure the punished hospital
can find no student willing to jointly deviate from this punishment—such an algorithm essentially
plays a role analogous to that of a minmax action profile in standard repeated games. I find that
certain variants of the student-proposing serial dictatorship satisfy both requirements.
The formal proofs are in Appendix A.3 and Appendix B.3. I describe the intuition for the
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punishment algorithm here. For simplicity, let us focus on the case when matching is one-to-one,
and suppose that f ∈ F1n is the hospital being punished.
The Algorithm: The algorithm assigns priorities to students according to f ’s preference ranking,
and then run the student-proposing serial dictatorship based on assigned priorities. As students
propose and exit the market, the algorithm moves down f ’s preference list. How high f ranks its
match therefore boils down to how early it is drafted by a student.
Why the Algorithm Lowers f ’s Payoff: From the students’ perspective, the hospitals are being sam-
pled without replacement, where a new hospitals is picked from the remaining ones each round.
Since preferences within each quality class are uniformly random, the number of draws it takes for
f to be sampled is uniformly distributed from 1 to |F1n|, so f will be matched uniformly within
the top |F1n|/n fraction of its preference list. If |F1n|/n is non-vanishing, there is a non-vanishing
probability that f will be excluded from the very top of its preference list, therefore lowering f ’s
payoff. In this way, the algorithm essentially leverages horizontal competition (or in other words,
the size of |F1n|) to punish f .
Why f Can Find No Student to Deviate With: If a student did not get matched to f , there are two
possibilities: either she picked a better hospital early on, or she had low priority because she is
ranked lower than the student who did get matched with f . Either way, f cannot find any better
student to replace its match.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework and solution concept for studying stability in repeated matching
markets, which combine elements from repeated noncooperative games with the cooperative sta-
bility notion for two-sided matching markets. While history-dependent play can be used to alter
the matches obtained by some hospitals, some other hospitals are immune to such influences due
to the unique payoff structure in matching environments. To understand the impact of such hospi-
tals, I consider large matching markets with correlated preferences. I find that in large matching
markets, these elite hospitals make up at most a negligible fraction of the market.
The analysis of repeated matching markets provides insights into market design. In one-shot
matching markets, the Rural Hospital Theorem rules out the possibility of improving matching
outcomes for rural hospitals. A contribution of the current paper is to show that in repeated match-
ing markets, while it is difficult to impose hiring caps on elite hospitals, it is nevertheless possible
to reduce the hiring capacity of most, if not all, other hospitals in the market without violating
stability. Stability therefore should not represent a hurdle for designing matching processes that
can make more residents available for rural hospitals. A promising avenue for future research is
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in understanding whether matching processes like simple exclusion can be self-enforcing in an
approximate sense in large matching markets.
By directly modeling deviations by coalitions, the repeated matching model that I developed
in this paper preserves the cooperative spirit of static matching models. My analysis is also con-
sistent with an alternative model where hospitals treat subsets of students as actions, and student
preferences are used to compute the payoffs accruing to hospitals under each action profile. In
this strategic-form game, a hospital in a top coalition has an action that guarantees its highest
payoff regardless of the actions of other hospitals. This equivalence holds only when utility is
non-transferable and there are no payoff externalities (see Appendix B.4 for a more detailed dis-
cussion and an illustrative example). In ongoing work, I consider repeated matching markets in
such environments, and prove the existence of self-enforcing matching process under a broad class
of preferences.
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A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose T = {(f̂k, Ŵk)}Kk=1. In both one-shot and repeated matching environments, the proof proceeds by
induction.
Static Stable Matching: In every static stable matching f̂1 and Ŵ1 must be matched together since they are
mutual favorites. Suppose f̂i and Ŵi must be matched together in all stable matchings for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
but suppose by contradiction that there is a stable matching m where f̂k and Ŵk are not matched together.
By the induction hypothesis, m(f̂k) ⊆ W\ ∪k−1i=1 Ŵi so u˜f̂ (Ŵk) > u˜f̂ (m(f̂k)), and m(w) ∈ F\{f̂i : 1 ≤
i ≤ k − 1} so f̂k w m(w) for all w ∈ Ŵk\m(f̂k). This is a contradiction to m being a stable matching,
since f̂k and Ŵk find it profitable to jointly deviate. So f̂k and Ŵk must be matched together in all stable
matchings. This completes the induction step.
Self-Enforcing Matching Process: The proof again proceeds by induction. First, I prove that in every self-
enforcing matching process µ, µ(f̂1|h) = Ŵ1 for all h ∈ HF . Suppose by contradiction that µ(f̂1|h˜) 6= Ŵ1
at some h˜ ∈ H. Consider the deviation plan d1 defined by d1(h) = Ŵ1 for all h ∈ H. d1 is clearly feasible
for f̂1 since f̂1 is every student’s favorite hospital. In addition,
U
f̂1
(h˜|µ) = (1− δ)u˜
f̂1
(µ(f̂1|h˜)) + δUf̂1(h˜, µ(h˜)|µ)
< (1− δ)u˜
f̂1
(Ŵ1) + δuf̂1(Ŵ1) = Uf̂1
(
h˜
∣∣[µ, (f̂1, d1)])
so d1 is also profitable for f̂1. This is a contradiction to µ being self-enforcing. So µ(f̂1|h) = Ŵ1 for all
h ∈ H.
Suppose it has been shown that in every self-enforcing matching process µ, µ(f̂i|h) = Ŵi for i =
1, . . . , k − 1 at every ex post history h ∈ H, and suppose by contradiction that there is a self-enforcing
matching process µ such that µ(f̂k|h˜) 6= Ŵk for some h˜ ∈ H. By the inductive hypothesis, µ(f̂k|h) ⊆
W\ ∪k−1i=1 Ŵi at all h ∈ H, so u˜f̂k(µ(f̂k|h˜)) < u˜f̂k(Ŵk), and Uf̂k(h˜ |µ) ≤ u˜f̂k(Ŵk).
Consider the deviation plan dk defined by dk(h) = Ŵk for all h ∈ H. dk is feasible for f̂k since for
every student inW\ ∪k−1i=1 Ŵi, f̂k is the best hospital among F\{fi}k−1i=1 . In addition
U
f̂k
(h˜|µ) = (1− δ)u˜
f̂k
(µ(f̂k|h˜)) + δUf̂k(h˜, µ(h˜) |µ)
< (1− δ)u˜
f̂k
(Ŵk) + δu˜f̂k
(Ŵk) = Uf̂k
(
h˜
∣∣[µ, (f̂k, d)])
so dk is both feasible and profitable, contradicting the assumption that µ is self-enforcing. So in every
self-enforcing matching process µ, µ(f̂k|h) = Ŵk at every ex post history h ∈ H. This completes the
induction.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
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A.2.1 Preliminaries
I first establish a few preliminary results in order to prove Theorem 3. Lemma 2 proves that when market
size is sufficiently large, an elite hospital f is very likely able to fill its quotas with students who 1. rank f
as their favorite hospital, and 2. give f close to the highest possible utility.
For every f ∈ F1n, let Ŵ 1n(f, ) ≡ {w ∈ W1n : f w f ′ for all f ′ ∈ F1n, and uf (w) > V (C1, 1)− }.
Lemma 2. Suppose
∣∣F1n∣∣ / ∣∣W1n∣∣ → 0. In the stage game, for every  > 0, there exists N such that
P
(∣∣Ŵ (f, , k)∣∣ > q) > 1−  for all n > N and every f ∈ F1n.
Proof. Let ζ ∈ [0, 1) be a number such that V (C1, ζ) > V (C1, 1) − . Define W˜ 1n(f, ) ≡ {w ∈ W1n :
f w f ′ for all f ′ ∈ F1n, and ζf,w > ζ}, so W˜ 1n(f, ) ⊆ Ŵ 1n(f, ).
From the perspective of hospital f ∈ F1n, every student w ∈ W1n satisfies ζf,w > ζ with probability
1− ζ > 0. Furthermore, a student is equally likely to rank any hospital within F1n as her top choice within
F1n. Let Yw(f, ) be the Bernoulli random variable that takes value 1 if w ∈ W˜ 1n(f, ) and 0 otherwise. Let
φ ≡ (1 − ζ)/ ∣∣F1n∣∣. Note that the random variables {Yw(f, ) : w ∈ W1n} are independently and identi-
cally distributed with rate φ, and as a result,
∣∣W˜ 1n(f, )∣∣ = ∑w∈Wn Yw(f, ) follows binomial distribution
B(
∣∣W1n∣∣ , φ). By the Chernoff bound,
P
( ∣∣W˜ 1n(f, )∣∣ ≤ q) ≤ min
t>0
etq
∏
w∈W1n
E
[
e−tYw(f,)
]
Since E
[
e−tYw(f,)
]
= 1 + φ(e−t − 1) ≤ eφ(e−t−1) for all w ∈ W1n, we have
P
( ∣∣W˜ 1n(f, )∣∣ ≤ q) ≤ min
t>0
etq · e|W1n|φ(e−t−1) ≤ eq · e|W1n|φ(e−1−1),
where the second inequality above follows from setting t = 1. Since
∣∣W1n∣∣φ = (1 − ζ) ∣∣W1n∣∣ / ∣∣F1n∣∣ → ∞
and e−1 − 1 < 0, we have P ( ∣∣W˜ 1n(f, )∣∣ ≤ q) → 0 as n → ∞. Finally, since W˜ 1n(f, ) ⊆ Ŵ 1n(f, ), it
follows that P (
∣∣Ŵ 1n(f, )∣∣ ≤ q)→ 0 as n→∞.
Lemma 3 shows that an elite hospital can secure a high continuation value in large markets.
Lemma 3. Suppose
∣∣F1n∣∣ / ∣∣W1n∣∣ → 0. For every  > 0 and discount factor 0 < δ < 1, there exists N
such that for all n > N , the continuation value of every f ∈ F1n in every self-enforcing matching process µ
satisfies Uf (h|µ) ≥ qV (C1, 1)−  at every ex ante history h.
Proof. Suppose that the stage game satisfies P
(∣∣Ŵ 1n(f, ˜)∣∣ > q) > 1 − ˜ for some ˜, and consider the
following deviation plan df by an arbitrary hospital f ∈ F1n: at every ex post history, given the realized
preferences in the current stage game,
df (h) = arg max
W⊆Ŵ 1n(f,˜), |W |≤q
∑
w∈W
uf (w).
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I first show that with sufficiently small ˜, hospital f can guarantee itself qV (C1, 1)− by using df to deviate
from any matching process. The claim of the lemma then follows by invoking Lemma 2.
Fix an arbitrary matching process µ. Note first that since every student in Ŵ 1n(f, ˜) ranks f as their
favorite hospital, df is a feasible deviation plan for f by construction.
To see that df guarantees qV (C1, 1)− for sufficiently small ˜, let T be large enough so that δTV (C1, 1)q <
/2. At every ex ante history h, hospital f ’s continuation payoff from the manipulated matching process
[µ, (f, df )] satisfies
Uf (h
∣∣ [µ, (f, df )]) ≥ (1− δT ){(1− ˜)T q(V (C1, 1)− ˜) + [1− (1− ˜)T ]0}+ δT · 0 (3)
= (1− δT )(1− ˜)T q(V (C1, 1)− ˜)
Inequality (3) above follows from decomposing f ’s continuation payoff between those accrued within the
first T and those after period T ; for the first T periods, the expected payoff is further decomposed by whether
|Ŵ 1n(f, ˜)| ≥ q all the way through this phase or not.
Since (1 − δT )(1 − ˜)T q(V (C1, 1) − ˜) → (1 − δT )qV (C1, 1) as ˜ → 0, we can find  such that
(1 − δT )(1 − )T q(V (C1, 1) − ) ≥ (1 − δT )qV (C1, 1) − /2. By Lemma 2, there exists N such that
P
(∣∣Ŵ 1n(f, )∣∣ > q) > 1−  for all n > N . So for all n > N , we have
Uf (h
∣∣ [µ, (f, df )]) ≥ (1− δT )qV (C1, 1)− /2
= (1− δT )qV (C1, 1) + δT qV (C1, 1)− /2− δT qV (C1, 1)
> (1− δT )qV (C1, 1) + δT qV (C1, 1)− /2− /2
= qV (C1, 1)− 
Finally, if µ is a self-enforcing matching process, then it must satisfies
Uf (h|µ) ≥ Uf (h
∣∣ [µ, (f, df )]) > qV (C1, 1)− 
at every ex ante history h.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Let  ≡ 1−δ2δ V (C1, 0). By Lemma 3, there exists N1 such that if n > N1, Uf (h|µ) ≥ V (C1, 1)−  for every
self-enforcing matching process µ at every ex ante history h. In addition, since
∣∣F1n∣∣ / ∣∣W1n∣∣ → 0, there
exist N2 such that q
∣∣F1n∣∣ < ∣∣W1n∣∣ for all n > N2. I consider market sizes larger than N ≡ max{N1, N2}.
Let µ be an arbitrary self-enforcing matching process, and suppose by contradiction that |µ(f |ĥ)| < q
at some ex post history ĥ. I will show that this leads to a contradiction.
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At ĥ, hospital f ’s continuation payoff at h satisfies
Uf (ĥ|µ) ≤ (1− δ)
∑
w∈µ(f |h)
uf (w) + δqV (C1, 1).
Meanwhile, since |W1n| > q
∣∣F1n∣∣, at history ĥ, there exists ŵ ∈ W1n such that µ(ŵ|ĥ) /∈ F1n. Consider the
following deviation plan df for hospital f :
df (h) =
µ(f |h) if h 6= ĥµ(f |h) ∪ {ŵ} if h = ĥ
Let m′ ≡ [µ(ĥ), (f, µ(f |ĥ) ∪ {ŵ})] denote the stage-game matching that results from f recruiting ŵ in
addition to its recommended students at ĥ. Hospital f ’s continuation payoff from the manipulated matching
process [µ, (f, df )] satisfies
Uf (ĥ|[µ, (f, df )]) = (1− δ)
[ ∑
w∈µ(f |h)
uf (w) + uf (ŵ)
]
+ δUf (ĥ,m
′|µ)
≥ (1− δ)
∑
w∈µ(f |h)
uf (w) + (1− δ)uf (ŵ) + δ[V (C1, 1)− ]
= (1− δ)
∑
w∈µ(f |h)
uf (w) + δV (C1, 1) + (1− δ)uf (ŵ)− δ
≥ Uf (ĥ|µ) + (1− δ)uf (ŵ)− δ
Since ŵ ∈ W1n, uf (ŵ) ≥ V (C1, 0). In addition, recall that  = 1−δ2δ V (C1, 0) by construction. We have
Uf (ĥ|[µ, (f, df )]) ≥ Uf (ĥ|µ) + 1− δ
2
V (C1, 0) > Uf (ĥ|µ),
contradicting the assumption that µ is self-enforcing.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
I focus on hospital quality classes that fill all their hiring quotas in static stable matchings, since otherwise the
statement of the theorem would be trivial. For hospitals that cannot fill their slots in static stable matchings,
it is possible to reduce their capacity even further, following similar arguments as the ones below.
Appendix A.3.1 introduces the submarket faced by Fkn ; Appendix A.3.2 characterizes the payoffs Fkn
obtain from the reward matching; Appendix A.3.3 introduces algorithm used to punishment a deviating
hospital, and characterize its expected payoff from such punishment. The matching process used to sustain
capacity reduction is constructed using these punishments and rewards, I leave the formal construction to
Appendix B.3.
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A.3.1 Submarkets
For each 1 ≤ l ≤ L, let QWn (l) ≡
∑
l′≤l |W l
′
n | denote the number of students who are in a quality class no
worse thanW ln; similarly, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, let QFn (k) ≡ q
∑
k′≤k |Fk
′
n | denote the number of hospital
seats that are in a quality class no worse than Fkn .
I say that a student quality classW ln is achievable by hospitals in quality class Fkn if
lim
n→∞
QWn (l)
QFn (k − 1)
≥ 1 and lim
n→∞
QWn (l − 1)
QFn (k)
≤ 1.
The first inequality above ensures that not all students inW ln can be absorbed by hospitals in higher quality
classes than Fkn ; the second inequality ensures that not all seats in Fkn can be filled by students in higher
quality classes than W ln. Let A(k) ⊆ {1, . . . , L} denote the set of student quality classes achievable by
hospital quality class k.
In the analysis in this section, when market size is sufficiently large, the only relevant students are those
that are in an achievable quality class. I therefore focus on the submarket that consists of only hospitals in
Fkn and students in its achievable quality classes.
Let the numbers α1, α2, . . . , αI ≥ 0 be numbers that satisfy
∑I−1
i=1 αi < 1 and
∑I
i=1 αi ≥ 1. Consider
a sequence of submarkets: for every n, the hospital side is made up of Fkn , while the student side consists of
∪Ii=1V in, where for each i,
V in ⊆ W in and
∣∣V in∣∣
|Fkn | q
→ αi as n→∞.
I treat each seat on the hospital side of the market as an individual player that inherits the preference of its
hospital. For each seat s, let u˜s(.) denote the utility function of the seat, which is identical to u˜f (.) of the
hospital that it belongs to.
A.3.2 Reward for Compliance
Let φ̂n denote the matching resulting from the seat-proposing random serial dictatorship in the submarket.
φ̂n is played as a reward for the hospitals when they comply with capacity reduction. Lemma 5 characterizes
the payoff from this reward. Noting that the matching φ̂n is Pareto efficient, I will make use of the following
result from Che and Tercieux (2018):
Lemma 4. (Che and Tercieux 2018) As n→∞,
∑
s us(φ̂n(s))
|Fkn | q
p−→
I−1∑
i=1
αiV (Ci, 1) + (1−
I−1∑
i=1
αi)V (CI , 1).
Lemma 5 shows that in φ̂n, every hospital obtains a randomly assigned common value from its matched
students, but obtains close to maximum idiosyncratic component from each student.
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Lemma 5. For every  > 0, there exists N such that
E[uf (φ̂n)] > q
[ I−1∑
i=1
αiV (Ci, 1) + (1−
I−1∑
i=1
αi)V (CI , 1)
]− .
for all market sizes n > N and every f ∈ Fkn .
Proof. To prove the claim, it suffices to prove thatE[us(φ̂n)] >
∑I−1
i=1 αiV (Ci, 1)+(1−
∑I−1
i=1 αi)V (CI , 1)−
 for all n > N and every individual seat s. This is what I will prove below.
Let
un ≡
∑
s us(φ̂n(s))
|Fkn | q
denote the average realized utilities for individual seats, and let Fn denote the probability distribution of this
random variable un. LetA−n () ≡ {un ≤
∑I−1
i=1 αiV (Ci, 1)+(1−
∑I−1
i=1 αi)V (CI , 1)− 12} be the event that
u is less than the payoff upper bound, andA+n () ≡ {un >
∑I−1
i=1 αiV (Ci, 1)+(1−
∑I−1
i=1 αi)V (CI , 1)−12}
be its complement.
Note that by the Law of Total Expectation, for every seat s,
E[us(φ̂n)] =
∫
E[us(φ̂n) |un ]dFn =
∫
A−n ()
E[us(φ̂n) |un ]dFn +
∫
A+n ()
E[us(φ̂n) |un ]dFn.
Since seats are treated symmetrically in a random serial dictatorship, it follows that E[us(φ̂n) |un ] = un.
So for every seat s,
E[us(φ̂n)] =
∫
A−n ()
un dFn +
∫
A+n ()
un dFn
≥ P (A−n ()) · 0 + P (A+n ())
[ I−1∑
i=1
αiV (Ci, 1) + (1−
I−1∑
i=1
αi)V (CI , 1)− 1
2

]
.
By Lemma 4, P (A+n ())→ 1 as n→∞. As the result, there existsN such thatE[us(φ̂n)] ≥
∑I−1
i=1 αiV (Ci, 1)+
(1−∑I−1i=1 αi)V (CI , 1)−  for all n > N and s ∈ Fkn .
A.3.3 Punishment for Deviation
Definition 4. Given a set of hospitals F ′, studentsW ′, and a hospital f ∈ F ′, the punitive matching for f ,
φf
n
, is the matching produced by the following procedure
1. Set S0 = ∅ and G0 = ∅.
2. If either F ′\Sk−1 = ∅ orW ′\Gk−1 = ∅, stop; otherwise, let ŵ be f ’s favorite student inW ′\Gk−1,
and f̂ be ŵ’s favorite hospital among F ′\Sk−1. Match f̂ and ŵ, set Sk = Sk−1 ∪ {f̂} and Gk =
Gk−1 ∪ {ŵ}. Go to Step k + 1.
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For a seat s belonging to a hospital f , let Rsn denote f ’s ranking of the student matched to seat s in the
matching φf
n
: that is, Rsn = j if φ
f
n
(s) is the j-th favorite student according to the preference of f . The next
lemma shows that Rsn is uniformly distributed.
Lemma 6. For every seat s belonging to f and 1 ≤ r ≤ ∣∣Fkn∣∣ q, P (Rsn = r) = 1|Fkn|q .
Proof. In the procedure in Definition 4, starting from f ’s favorite student, each student takes turn to pick
a seat from the remaining seats. As we move down f ’s preference list, the first student to pick seat s will
determine Rsn.
We can equivalently think of Rsn as being determined through sampling without replacement from an
urn that contains a red ball (representing seat s) and (
∣∣Fkn∣∣ q − 1) black balls (representing all other seats).
Specifically, Rsn is the number of draws it takes for the red ball to be sampled. Since the red ball is equally
likely to be in any position in the sequence of balls to be drawn, P (Rsn = r) =
1
|Fkn|q for 1 ≤ r ≤∣∣Fkn∣∣ q.
Lemma 7 shows that if a hospital is excluded from the very top section of its preference list, then with
high probability it obtains a low utility.
Lemma 7. Fix any 0 <  < 1 and 0 < γ < . For every f ∈ Fkn , let Xfn denote the event that, according
to f ’s preference, the worst γ
∣∣VIn∣∣ students in VIn all satisfy ζf,w < . Then P (Xfn)→ 1 as n→∞.
Proof. For each f ∈ Fkn let Kfn be the number of students in VIn such that ζf,w < . I first prove that
P (Kfn < γ
∣∣VIn∣∣)→ 0 as n→∞.
Since ζf,w is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], K
f
n follows binomial distributionB(
∣∣VIn∣∣ , ). By Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality, for every f ∈ Fkn ,
P (Kfn < γ
∣∣VIn∣∣) ≤ 12exp{−2(
∣∣VIn∣∣− γ ∣∣VIn∣∣)2
|VIn|
}
→ 0
as n→∞. The claim of the lemma follows since {Kfn ≥ γ
∣∣VIn∣∣} ⊆ Xfn .
Lemma 8 proves that as market gets large, the payoff f obtains from the punishment algorithm in
Definition 4 is bounded away from what it obtains from the reward matching φ̂n.
Lemma 8. There exists g > 0 and N such that
E[uf (φfn)] < q
[ I−1∑
i=1
αiV (Ci, 1) + (1−
I−1∑
i=1
αi)V (CI , 1)
]− g
for all f ∈ Fkn and n > N .
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Proof. To prove the claim, it suffices to prove that there exists g > 0 and N such that if n > N , then
E[us(φfn)] <
I−1∑
i=1
αiV (Ci, 1) + (1−
I−1∑
i=1
αi)V (CI , 1)− g
for every hospital f ∈ Fkn and seat s belonging to f . This is what I will prove below.
For every f ∈ Fkn , every seat s belonging to f , and 1 ≤ i ≤ I , let
Asn(i) ≡
{ ∑
j≤i−1
∣∣Vjn∣∣ < Rsn ≤∑
j≤i
∣∣Vjn∣∣ }
denote the event that s is matched to a student in V in in the matching φfn. By Lemma 6, Rsn is uniformly
distributed for every s and f , so P (Asn(i)) is independent of f or s, and I will write p
i
n ≡ P (Asn(i)) for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ I .
Fix an (
∑I
i=1 αi − 1)/αI <  < 1 and (
∑I
i=1 αi − 1)/αI < γ < .13 Since the function V (CI , .) is
strictly increasing, there exists gI > 0 such that V (CI , ζ) < V (CI , 1) − gI for all ζ < . For every seat s
belonging to any f ∈ Fkn , let
Γsn ≡
{ I−1∑
i=1
∣∣V in∣∣+ (1− γ) ∣∣VIn∣∣ ≤ Rsn ≤ I∑
i=1
∣∣V in∣∣ }
denote the event that s is matched to the γ-tail section of VIn in the matching φfn. Again, by Lemma 6, Rsn is
uniformly distributed so P (Γsn) is independent of f or s. I will write p
Γ
n ≡ P (Γsn).
For each hospital f ∈ Fkn , let Xfn denote the event that, according to any hospital f ’s preference,
students in the γ-tail section of VIn all satisfy V (CI , ζf,w) < V (CI , 1) − gI . Since all hospitals in Fkn are
symmetric, the probability P (Xfn) does not depend on f , and I will simply write pXn ≡ P (Xfn).
By the definition of the events Γsn and X
f
n , we have, for every f ∈ Fkn and seat s belonging to f ,
P
(
us(φ
f
n
) < V (CI , 1)− gI |Asn(I)
) ≥ P (Γsn ∩Xfn |Asn(I))
= P (Γsn ∩Xfn ∩Asn(I)) /P (Asn(I))
= P (Γsn ∩Xfn) /P (Asn(I))
=
[
pΓn − P
(
Γsn ∩ (Xfn)c
)]
/ pIn
≥
[
pΓn − (1− pXn )
)]
/ pIn (4)
Note that the second expression above follows since Γsn ⊆ Asn(I).
As n → ∞, pIn → 1 −
∑I−1
i=1 αi > 0 and p
Γ
n → 1 −
∑I−1
i=1 αi − (1 − γ)αI > 0. Importantly, these
limits are all strictly positive numbers.14 In addition, by Lemma 7, pXn → 1 as n → ∞. So inequality (4)
13Note that αI > 0 , and 0 < (
∑I
i=1 αi − 1)/αI = 1− (1−
∑I−1
i=1 αi)/αI < 1. So such  always exists.
14To see why, note that by our choice of γ, pΓn = 1 −
∑I−1
i=1 αi − (1 − γ)αI > 1 −
∑I−1
i=1 αi − [1 −
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implies that there exits NIsuch that if n ≥ NI ,
P
(
us(φ
f
n
) < V (CI , 1)− gI | Asn(I)
)
≥ p
Γ
n
2pIn
,
for all f ∈ Fkn and seat s belonging to f , and therefore
E
(
us(φ
f
n
) | Asn(I)
)
< V (CI , 1)− gI p
Γ
n
2pIn
. (5)
Meanwhile, for 1 ≤ i ≤ I − 1, pin → αi ≥ 0 and
E
(
us(φ
f
n
) | Asn(i)
) ≤ V (Ci, 1). (6)
Define g ≡ (1−∑I−1i=1 αi)gI pΓn2pIn > 0. Combining inequalities (5) and (6), there must exist N such that
for all n > N ,
E
(
us(φ
f
n
)
)
=
∑
1≤i≤m
pin E
(
us(φ
f
n
) | Asn(i)
)
<
I−1∑
i=1
αiV (Ci, 1) + (1−
I−1∑
i=1
αi)V (CI , 1)− g
for all f ∈ Fkn and seat s belonging to f . This completes the proof.
Finally, Lemma 9 proves that when a hospital f is being punished, it cannot find any profitable deviations
with students.
Lemma 9. For every f ∈ Fkn , no coalition in the form of (f,W ) can be a profitable deviation from the
matching φf
n
.
Proof. Suppose there is a profitable coalition (f,W ) for some W . Let w ∈ W\φf
n
(f) be any new student
in W who is not originally matched to f in φf
n
. I will show that uf (w′) > uf (w) for all w′ ∈ φfn(f). This
will be a contradiction to (f,W ) being a profitable coalition, because in this case any new student in W
is worse than the student in φf
n
(f) she replaced. It is then impossible for f to prefer W over φf
n
(f) since
hospitals’ preferences are responsive.
To this end, first observe that if there exists w′ ∈ φf
n
(f) such that uf (w′) < uf (w), then it means that
in Step 2 in the punishment algorithm in Definition 4, w chose φf
n
(w) over f when f still had vacancy
(which would later be filled by w′) so φf
n
(w) w f , and w does not find this deviation profitable. This is a
contradiction. So uf (w′) > uf (w) for all w′ ∈ φfn(f). This completes the proof.
(
∑I
i=1 αi − 1)/αI ]αI = 0
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B Supplementary Appendix (Not for Publication)
B.1 Preliminary Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. At each history h, hospital f faces a decision over whether and how to deviate
with students that are currently in the market. Suppose hospital f has a deviation plan df from matching
process µ that is both feasible and profitable, since stage-game payoffs are bounded for hospital f and there
is discounting, the standard one-shot deviation principle for individual decision making (Blackwell 1965)
implies that there exists a history ĥ ∈ H such that
(1− δ)u˜f (df (ĥ)) + δUf
(
ĥ,
[
µ(ĥ), (f, df (ĥ))
] ∣∣µ) > Uf (ĥ|µ).
Consider the deviation plan dof that satisfies d
o
f (h) = df (h) if h = ĥ, and d
o
f (h) = µ(f |h) otherwise. dof is
a profitable one-shot deviation plan for hospital f .
Lemma 10 shows that if a hospital deviates from the recommended matching with a group of students,
then this deviating hospital can be uniquely identified by comparing the resulting matching against the
recommended matching.
Lemma 10. Let m be a static matching. If [m, (f,W )] = [m, (f ′,W ′)] 6= m, then f = f ′.
Proof. Let m ≡ [m, (f,W )], and m̂ ≡ [m, (f ′,W ′)]. Suppose by contradiction that f 6= f ′, but m̂ = m 6=
m. There are three cases to consider:
1. If W ⊆ m(f): then m(f ′) = m(f ′) 6= m̂(f ′), so m 6= m̂, a contradiction.
2. If W * m(f): then m(f) * m(f) but m̂(f) ⊆ m(f), so m 6= m̂, a contradiction.
Therefore, [m, (f,W )] = [m, (f ′,W ′)] 6= m implies f = f ′.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Fix λ0 ∈ Λ∗ and define u0 = u(λ0). Observe that for hospitals in F ∩ R, the set M◦R satisfies the non-
equivalent utilities (NEU) condition in Abreu et al. (1994): holding f ∈ F ∩R unmatched, f is indifferent
towards how another hospital f ′ ∈ F ∩ R matches with students, so their utilities cannot be positive affine
transformation of another. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in Abreu et al. (1994) then ensure the existence of vectors
{uf : f ∈ F ∩R} ⊆ U∗, such that
uff < u
0
f and u
f
f < u
f ′
f
for all f, f ′ ∈ F ∩ R and f 6= f ′. Let λf ∈ Λ∗ be the distribution over MR that give rise to the payoff
vector uf for each f . In addition, for each f ∈ F ∩R, let
mf ≡ arg min
m∈M◦R
max
W⊆Df (m),|W |≤qf
uf (W )
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be the stage-game recommendation to minmax hospital f .
Consider the matching process represented by the automaton (Θ, γ0, f, γ), where
1. Θ =
{
θ(e,m) : e ∈ F ∩R ∪ {0},m ∈ MR
} ∪ {θ(f, t) : f ∈ F ∩R, 0 ≤ t < L} is the set of all
states;
2. γ0 is the initial distribution over states, which satisfies γ0(θ(0,m)) = λ0(m) for all m ∈M◦R;
3. O : Θ→M is the output function, where O(θ(e,m)) = m and O(θ(f, t)) = mf ;
4. κ : Θ×M → ∆(Θ) is the transition function. For states {θ(f, t)|0 ≤ t < L− 1}, κ is defined as
κ
(
θ(f, t),m′
)
=
θ(f ′, 0) if m′ 6= mf ; m′ = [mf ′ , (f ′,W )] for some f ′ ∈ F ∩R and W ⊆ Wθ(f, t+ 1) otherwise
For states θ(f, L− 1), the transition is defined as
κ
(
θ(f, L−1),m′) =
θ(f ′, 0) if m′ 6= mf ; m′ = [mf ′ , (f ′,W )] for some f ′ ∈ F ∩R and W ⊆ Wγf otherwise
where for each f ∈ F ∩ R, pf is the distribution over states that satisfies γf (θ(f,m)) = λf (m) for
all m ∈M .
For states θ(e,m), the transition is
κ
(
θ(e,m),m′
)
=
θ(f ′, 0) if m′ 6= mf ; m′ = [mf ′ , (f ′,W )] for some f ′ ∈ F ∩R and W ⊆ Wγe otherwise
where the distributions γe are defined as above.
Note that owing to the identifiability of deviating hospital (Lemma 10), for any θ ∈ Θ and matching m′ 6=
O(θ), we can uniquely identify the hospital responsible for this deviation, so the transition above is well-
defined.
Note that no hospitals in T wish to deviate, since they are always matched with their top coalition
students; no students want to deviate since all recommended matchings are in M◦R. It remains to verify no
hospital f ∈ F ∩R has incentives to deviate. Choose a number Z > sup{m∈M,f∈F∩R} uf (m)
For states of the form
{
θ(e,m)
}
: Consider a one-shot deviation (f,W ). There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: f 6= e. Without deviation, f has value (1 − δ)uf (m) + δuef . After deviation, f yields less than
(1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)uRf + δL+1uff . There is no profitable one-shot deviation for f if
(1− δ)uf (m) + δuef ≥ (1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)uRf + δL+1uff
As δ → 1, the LHS converges to uef while the RHS converges to uff . By construction, uef > uff , so such
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deviations are not profitable for δ high enough.
Case 2: f = e. Without deviation, f has value (1 − δ)uf (m) + δuff . After deviation, f yields less than
(1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)uRf + δL+1uff . There is no profitable one-shot deviation for f if
(1− δ)uf (m) + δuff ≥ (1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)uRf + δL+1uff .
The inequality is equivalent to
Z − uf (m) ≤ δ(1 + . . .+ δL−1)[uff − uRf ]
By construction, uff − uRf > 0. Choose L large enough so that L(uff − uRf ) > Z − uf (m). As δ → 1, the
LHS remains unchanged while the RHS converges to L(uff − uRf ), so such deviations are not profitable for
δ high enough.
For states of the form
{
θ(f, t)
}
: Consider a one-shot deviation (f ′,W ). There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: f ′ 6= f . Without deviation, hospital f ′ has payoff (1− δL−t)uf ′(mf ) + δL−tuff ′ . After deviation,
f ′ has payoff less than (1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)uRf ′ + δL+1uf
′
f ′ . There is no profitable one-shot deviation for f
′
if
(1− δL−t)uf ′(mf ) + δL−tuff ′ ≥ (1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)uRf ′ + δL+1uf
′
f ′
As δ → 1, the LHS converges to uff ′ for all 0 ≤ t ≤ L, while the RHS converges to uf
′
f ′ . By construction
uff ′ > u
f ′
f ′ . So the above inequality holds for sufficiently high δ.
Case 2: f ′ = f . Without deviation, hospital f ′ has payoff (1− δL−t)uRf ′ + δL−tuf
′
f ′ . When deviating from
mf ′ , f
′ can obtain at most uRf . So its payoff from deviation is at most
(1− δ)uRf ′ + δ(1− δL)uRf ′ + δL+1uf
′
f ′ = (1− δL+1)uRf ′ + δL+1uf
′
f ′
Hospital f ′ has no profitable deviation if (1− δL−t)uRf ′ + δL−tuf
′
f ′ ≥ (1− δL+1)uRf ′ + δL+1uf
′
f ′ , or
uf
′
f ′ ≥ uRf ′ .
This is true by construction. So f ′ has no profitable one-shot deviation.
We have verified that there is no profitable one-shot deviation in any states of the automaton. This
completes the proof.
B.3 Completion of the Proof of Theorem 4
Recall that QWn (l) ≡
∑
l′≤l |W l
′
n | denote the number of students who are in a quality class no worse than
W ln, while QFn (k) ≡ q
∑
k′≤k |Fk
′
n | denote the number of hospital seats that are in a quality class no worse
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than Fkn . Let A(k) = {j + 1, . . . , j + I} be the set of student quality classes achievable by hospitals in
quality class k. By definition, there exists N0 such that for all n > N0 and every l /∈ A(k),
either QWn (l) < Q
F
n (k − 1) or QWn (l − 1) > QFn (k). (7)
I focus on market sizes greater than this N0. By the inequalities in (7), in all the matchings defined below,
students in any unachievable quality class by Fkn are either already matched to hospitals in a higher quality
class, or ranked too low to be relevant for Fkn . Therefore, to analyze the payoff for a hospital f ∈ Fkn , it
suffices to isolate Fkn and ∪l∈A(k)W ln as if they are the only hospitals and students in the market. For each
l ∈ A(k), let
αl ≡ lim
n→∞
{
QWn (l)−max{QWn (l − 1), QFn (k − 1)}
q|Fkn |
}
.
denote the asymptotic share of seats in Fkn filled by students inW ln. Since |Wn| = dβnqe, we know all αl’s
are finite numbers. Note that they also satisfy
∑I−1
i=1 αj+i < 1 and
∑I
i=1 αj+i ≥ 1.
Minmax Matching. For each f ∈ Fkn , consider the matching mfn defined by the following procedure:
1. Let φ<n be a stable matching between∪j<kF jn andWn. Setmfn(f ′) = φ<(f ′) for every f ′ ∈ ∪j<kF jn;
2. Let φf
n
be the punitive matching for f among Fkn andWn\φ<n (∪j<kF jn). Set mfn(f ′) = φfn(f ′) for
every f ′ ∈ Fkn ;
3. Let φ>n be a stable matching between ∪j>kF jn and Wn\
[
φ<n (∪j<kF jn) ∪ φfn(Fkn)
]
. Set mfn(f ′) =
φ>n (f
′) for every f ′ ∈ ∪j>kF jn.
By Lemma 8, there exists g > 0 and market size N1 such that E[uf (mfn)] <
∑I−1
i=1 αj+iV (Cj+i, 1) +
(1−∑I−1i=1 αj+i)V (Cj+I , 1)− g for all f ∈ Fkn and n > N1.
Reward Matching. Consider the matching m̂n defined by the following procedure:
1. Let φ<n be a stable matching between ∪j<kF jn andWn. Set m̂n(f) = φ<n (f) for every f ∈ ∪j<kF jn;
2. Let φ̂n be the matching resulting from hospital-proposing random serial dictatorship between Fkn and
Wn\φ<n (∪j<kF jn). Set m̂n(f) = φ̂n(f) for all f ∈ Fkn ;
3. Let φ>n be a stable matching between ∪j>kF jn and Wn\
[
φ<n (∪j<kF jn) ∪ φ̂n(Fkn)
]
. Set m̂n(f) =
φ>n (f) for every f ∈ ∪j>kF jn.
By Lemma 5, there exists market size N2 such that E[uf (m̂n)] >
∑I−1
i=1 αj+iV (Cj+i, 1) + (1 −∑I−1
i=1 αj+i)V (Cj+I , 1)− 12g for all f ∈ Fkn and n > N2.
I focus on market sizes greater than N ≡ max{N0, N1, N2}. In particular,
E[uf (m̂n)] > E[uf (mfn)] +
1
2
g (8)
for all n > N and all f ∈ Fkn .
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Matching with Reduced Capacity. Consider the matching m∗n defined by the following procedure:
1. Let φ<n be a stable matching between ∪j<kF jn andWn. Set m∗n(f) = φ<n (f) for every f ∈ ∪j<kF jn;
2. Let φ∗n be the student-proposing stable matching between Fkn andWn\φ<n (∪j<kF jn), where instead
of letting every hospital use up its hiring capacity q, I treat each hospital as if only having (q − 1)
quotas. Set m∗n(f) = φ∗n(f) for every f ∈ Fkn .
3. Let φ>n be a stable matching between ∪j>kF jn and Wn\
[
φ<n (∪j<kF jn) ∪ φ∗n(Fkn)
]
. Set m∗n(f) =
φ>n (f) for every f ∈ ∪j>kF jn.
Observe that E[uf (m∗n)] ≥ 0 for every f ∈ Fkn . Combine this with inequality (8), we know there exists
p0 ∈ (0, 1) and 0 > 0 such that
p0E[uf (m∗n)] + (1− p0)E[uf (m̂n)] > E[uf (mfn)] + 0
for all n > N and every f ∈ Fkn . Let λ0n denote the lottery over m∗n and m̂n with p0 weight on m∗n and
(1− p0) weight on m̂n, then the inequality above is equivalent to
E[uf (λ0n)] > E[uf (mfn)] + 0 (9)
for all n > N and every f ∈ Fkn .
Hospital-Specific Punishments. For each hospital f ∈ Fkn , consider the matching mfn defined by the
following procedure:
1. Let φ<n be a stable matching between∪j<kF jn andWn. Setmfn(f ′) = φ<n (f ′) for every f ′ ∈ ∪j<kF jn;
2. Let φfn be the student-proposing stable matching between Fkn andWn\φ<n (∪j<kF jn), where we treat
hospital f as if having 0 quota, while others are allowed to hire up to full capacity. Set mfn(f ′) =
φfn(f ′) for every f ′ ∈ Fkn .
3. Let φ>n be a stable matching between ∪j>kF jn and Wn\
[
φ<n (∪j<kF jn) ∪ φfn(Fkn)
]
. Set mfn(f ′) =
φ>n (f
′) for every f ′ ∈ ∪j>kF jn.
Observe that E[uf ′(mfn)] ≥ 0 for all n > N and f, f ′ ∈ Fkn . Combine this with inequality (9), we know
there exists pr ∈ (0, 1) and 1 such that for all n > N and f, f ′ ∈ Fkn ,
prE[uf (λ0n)] + (1− pr)E[uf (mf
′
n )] > E[uf (mfn)] + 1
Also since E[uf (mfn)] = 0 for all n > N and f ∈ Fkn , combined with inequality (9), we know there exists
2 such that for all f ∈ Fkn ,
E[uf (λ0n)] > prE[uf (λ0n)] + (1− pr)E[uf (mfn)] + 2
Lastly, since E[uf ′(mfn)] ≥ qV (C1, 0) > 0 = E[uf (mfn)] for all n > N and f, f ′ ∈ Fkn where f 6= f ′,
combined with inequality (9), we know there exists 3 such that for all n > N and all f, f ′ ∈ Fkn with
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f 6= f ′,
prE[uf (λ0n)] + (1− pr)E[uf (mf
′
n )] > p
rE[uf (λ0n)] + (1− pr)E[uf (mfn)] + 3
Let  = min{1, 2, 3} and let λfn denote the compound lottery placing pr weight on the lottery λ0n and
(1− pr) on the matching mfn, the above three inequalities imply that for all n > N
E[uf (λf
′
n )] > E[uf (mfn)] +  for all f, f ′ ∈ Fkn (10)
E[uf (λfn)] < E[uf (λ0n)]−  for all f ∈ Fkn (11)
E[uf (λfn)] < E[uf (λf
′
n )]−  for all f, f ′ ∈ Fkn and f 6= f ′ (12)
Taken together, inequalities (10), (11) and (12) imply that the matchings {λfn : f ∈ Fkn} form hospital-
specific punishments for λ0n for all n > N .
A Capacity-Reducing, Self-Enforcing Matching Process. Consider the matching process represented by
the automaton (Θ, γ0, O, κ), where
1. Θn =
{
θ(e,m) : f ∈ Fkn ∪ {0}; m ∈ Mn
} ∪ {θ(f, t) : f ∈ Fkn , 0 ≤ t < L} is the set of all
possible states;
2. γ0 is the initial distribution over states, which satisfies γ0(θ(0,m)) = λ0(m) for all m ∈Mn;
3. O : Θ→Mn is the output function, where O(θ(f,m)) = m and O(θ(f, t)) = mfn;
4. κ : Θ×Mn → ∆(Θ) is the transition function defined as follows.
For states {θ(f, t)|0 ≤ t < L− 1}, κ is defined as
κ
(
θ(f, t),m′
)
=
θ(f ′, 0) if m′ 6= m
f
n; m′ = [mfn, (f ′,W )] for some f ′ ∈ Fkn and W ⊆ Wn
θ(f, t+ 1) otherwise
For states θ(f, L− 1), the transition is defined as
κ
(
θ(f, L−1),m′) =
θ(f ′, 0) if m′ 6= m
f
n; m′ = [mfn, (f ′,W )] for some f ′ ∈ Fkn and W ⊆ Wn
γf otherwise
where pf is the distribution over states that satisfies γf (θ(f,m)) = λf (m) for all f ∈ Fkn and
m ∈Mn.
For states θ(e,m), the transition is
κ
(
θ(e,m),m′
)
=
θ(f ′, 0) if m′ 6= m; m′ = [m, (f ′,W )] for some f ′ ∈ Fkn and W ⊆ Wnγe otherwise
where γf and γ0 are defined as above.
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The matching process represented by the above automaton randomizes over MR according to λ0 in every
period. It remains to verify no hospital has profitable one shot deviations in any automaton state.
For states of the form θ(e,m): Consider a one-shot deviation (f ′,W ) by hospital f ′. There are two cases
to consider.
Case 1: f ′ 6= e. Choose a number Z > qV (C1, 1), so no hospital can derive payoff higher than Z from any
deviation. Without deviation, f ′ has value (1− δ)uf ′(m) + δE[uf ′(λen)]. After deviation, f ′ yields less than
(1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)E[uf ′(mf
′
n )] + δL+1E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]. There is no profitable one-shot deviation for f ′ if
(1− δ)uf ′(m) + δE[uf ′(λen)] ≥ (1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)E[uf ′(mf
′
n )] + δ
L+1E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]
As δ → 1, the LHS converges to E[uf ′(λen)] while the RHS converges to E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]. By (11) and (12) ,
E[uf ′(λen)] > E[uf ′(λ
f ′
n )] +  for all n > N . It follows that there is a δ1 such that these deviations are not
profitable for δ > δ1 and n > N .
Case 2: f ′ = e. Without deviation, f ′ has value (1 − δ)uf ′(m) + δE[uf ′(λf
′
n )]. After deviation, f ′ yields
less than (1 − δ)Z + δ(1 − δL)E[uf ′(mf
′
n )] + δL+1E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]. There is no profitable one-shot deviation
for f ′ if
(1− δ)uf ′(m) + δE[uf ′(λf ′n )] ≥ (1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)E[uf ′(mf
′
n )] + δ
L+1E[uf ′(λf
′
n )].
The inequality is equivalent to
Z − uf ′(m) ≤ δ(1 + . . .+ δL−1)
[
E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]− E[uf ′(mf
′
n )]
]
.
By (10), E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]− E[uf ′(mf
′
n )] >  for all n > N . Choose L large enough so that L > Z − uf ′(m).
As δ → 1, the LHS remains unchanged while the RHS converges to L(E[uf ′(λf
′
n )] − E[uf ′(mf
′
n )]) > L,
there exist δ2 such that no deviation is profitable for δ > δ2 and n > N .
For states of the form θ(f, t): there are two cases to consider.
Case 1: f ′ 6= f . Without deviation, f ′ has payoff (1 − δL−t)E[uf ′(mfn)] + δL−tE[uf ′(λfn)]. With any
deviation, f ′ has payoff less than (1 − δ)Z + δ(1 − δL)E[uf ′(mf
′
n )] + δL+1E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]. There is no
profitable one-shot deviation for f ′ if
(1− δL−t)E[uf ′(mfn)] + δL−tE[uf ′(λfn)] ≥ (1− δ)Z + δ(1− δL)E[uf ′(mf
′
n )] + δ
L+1E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]
As δ → 1, the LHS converges to E[uf ′(λfn)] for all t such that 0 ≤ t ≤ L, while the RHS converges to
E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]. By (12), E[uf ′(λfn)] > E[uf ′(λf
′
n )]+ for all n > N . So there exists δ3 such that for all δ > δ3
and n > N there is no profitable deviations.
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Case 2: f ′ = f . Without deviation, hospital f ′ has payoff
(1− δL−t)E[uf ′(mf ′n )] + δL−tE[uf ′(λf
′
n )].
When deviating from mk′ , by Lemma 9, f
′’s stage-game payoff is at most E[uf ′(mf
′
n )]. So f ′’s discounted
expected payoff from deviation is at most
(1−δ)E[uf ′(mf ′n )]+δ(1−δL)E[uf ′(mf
′
n )]+δ
L+1E[uf ′(λf
′
n )] = (1−δL+1)E[uf ′(mf
′
n )]+δ
L+1E[uf ′(λf
′
n )].
Hospital f ′ has no profitable deviation if
(1− δL−t)E[uf ′(mf ′n )] + δL−tE[uf ′(λf
′
n )] ≥ (1− δL+1)E[uf ′(mf
′
n )] + δ
L+1E[uf ′(λf
′
n )],
or
E[uf ′(λf
′
n )] > E[uf ′(mf
′
n )].
which is true for all n > N . So f ′ has no profitable one-shot deviation for all n > N .
Define δ ≡ max{δ1, δ2, δ3}. There is no profitable one-shot deviation in any states of the automaton, as
long as δ > δ and n > N . This completes the proof.
B.4 Can Hospitals Treat Students As Actions?
In this section I consider a non-cooperative game where hospitals choose students as actions, and discuss its
relation to cooperative game form of two-sided matching games. When the matching environment has no
transfers and no peer effects, this non-cooperative game yields the same outcome as the cooperative game
form of two-sided matching games. However, this equivalence breaks down in matching games with money
or externalities. One advantage of the hybrid solution concept in Definition 1 is therefore its portability to
all kinds of matching environments.
Below I illustrate the difference between matching games and the non-cooperative game form using
an example: the key difference is whether or not students are given agency in the formation of blocking
coalitions.
A Static Matching Game with Peer Effects. There are two hospitals F = {f1, f2} and two students
W = {w1, w2}. There is no money. Each hospital has capacity to hire both students.
Hospitals: Let uk(.) be hospital fk’s utility function for students. Assume each hospital derives 1 util from
hiring each student, and both hospitals have additive utilities for the two positions to be filled. Formally,
uk({w1}) = uk({w2}) = 1, and uk({w1, w2}) = 2 for k = 1, 2.
Students: Let vj(f, w) be student wj’s utility from working for hospital f , alongside colleague w. Assume
vj(f2, . ) = 0 for j = 1, 2, so both students are indifferent between working for f2 and their outside options,
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regardless of colleagues. Assume vj(f1, ∅) = 2 and vj(f1, wi) = 1 for all j = 1, 2 and i 6= j: both students
enjoy working for f1 but prefer working alone.
Stable Matchings. There are three stable matchings, as illustrated in Figure 5. Notice that m1 and m2
are stable matchings because the coalition {w1, w2} is not a feasible deviation for f1: since students have
agency in the formation of blocking coalitions, and students dislike colleagues, in both m1 and m2, the
coalition {f1, w1, w2} is turned down by f1’s existing student.
f2
f1
w2
w1
m1
f2
f1
w2
w1
m2
f2
f1
w2
w1
m3
FIGURE 5. Three Stable Matchings
Non-Cooperative Game with Students As Actions. Figure 6 shows the non-cooperative game with
students treated as actions. Essentially, all Nash equilibria correspond to m3.
Firm f2
w1 w2 {w1, w2}
Firm f1
w1 (1, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1)
w2 (1, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
{w1, w2} (2, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0)
FIGURE 6. Students As Actions
Note that neither m1 nor m2 is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium here, because this non-cooperative
game does not give agency to students in the formation of blocking coalitions.
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